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The Effects of Coca Production on 21st Century Latin American Development 
Introduction: 
The beginning of the 21st Century has seen a significant growth in the cocaine industry. 
Estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime allocate more than $300bn US 
dollars to the illegal drug industry, a number that is growing larger each year (UNODC, 2019). 
While demand plays an important role in determining the size of this market, I find that 
analyzing the evolution of coca production in South America sheds light on the ineffectiveness 
of the War on Drugs focused on the supply of cocaine to dismantle drug trafficking. Illicit 
cocaine production has had negative effects on the economic development of 21st Century 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, as internationally backed efforts to disintegrate the global drug 
industry through crop eradication and fumigation tactics have been in vain. 
Literature Review: 
Wainwright (2016) argues that drug cartels operate like Walmart because they buy 
wholesale cocaine from farmers. Therefore, they operate as a monopsony as they set the prices 
for a kilo of cocaine bought from farmers. This explains why crop eradication is not efficient: 
farmers in other places will continue to grow the crop if the cartel gives them higher profits than 
legal crops. Cartels are different from legal business because of the price markups that they have. 
A kilo of cocaine costs around: $385 in coca leaves to $800 as wholesale cocaine to $2200 for 
export to $14500 for import to the US to $19500 at a mid-level dealer to $78000 street price and 
finally $122000 accounting for purity. Attacking the industry at its source is the least effective 
way since it only impoverishes farmers. It is like expecting the price of an artwork to increase if 
the price of paint increases rather than an industry like chocolate bars when the price of cocoa 
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beans increases. Likewise, Reid (2017) states that the price of cocaine is determined by risk 
rather than by the cost of production. Markups give huge profits to mafias that use the money to 
protect their industry by challenging the monopoly of force by the state and by corrupting local 
governments. Attacking coca production from the supply side only hurts poor farmers and has 
the unintended effect of spreading the industry by forcing cartels to expand production to 
different areas and extend their control over these regions. 
From a more political perspective, Edwards (2012) looks at how the illegal drug trade 
affects the quality of institutions in Latin America, an important cornerstone of economic 
development in the region. US policy shifts from trafficking countries to source countries have 
been successful in reducing the power (political and economic) of drug lords in South America, 
but also pushed the industry into clandestine operations which have expanded thanks to the 
modernization of distribution methods. Production has increased, and the industry has moved 
closer to the US, where trafficking in Mexico has become the hub of the industry. A culture of 
crime and corruption impedes economic progress (less FDI and education/productivity) which 
results in a vicious cycle between the industry and Latin American economies. 
Grandin (2010), who focuses on the effects on imperialism in Latin America (including 
the War on Drugs) thinks that the imposition of neoliberalism led to a drug crisis in Bolivia 
(alternative to mining industry). Financial liberalization made it easier to launder profit through 
the banking system. Pressure form the US to attack coca production at its source in the Andes 
had no profound effect on the larger scale trafficking industry. Taxes collected from coca 
trafficking in Colombia fund guerilla groups like FARC and paramilitary groups, both operating 
with almost full impunity. As the United States under George W. Bush (post 9/11) began to mix 
terrorism, guerillas, and drug traffickers into the same category, the efforts to tackle coca 
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production have consisted mostly of crop eradication and fumigation tactics rather than poverty 
alleviation and agricultural substitution programs. US outsourcing of antinarcotic fumigation 
campaigns to private firms has resulted in little regulation and oversight of the toxicity of 
chemicals. Lastly, Gootenberg (2008) who looks at the history on Andean Cocaine since its 
indigenous origins, sheds light on the artificially created criminal underworld of the cocaine 
industry. In other words, foreign and local policy to destroy the industry has worked to create a 
global illicit cocaine culture which has had undesired effects such as lower drug prices, higher 
levels of drug abuse in consumer countries, and connections to human rights abuses and other 
cases of abhorrent violence. One can only hope that policy-makers understand the realities of 
inefficient supply-focused policies which have had secondary negative effects on poor South 
American farmers. 
Empirical Analysis: 
By running a linear regression between the moment of policy change by the U.S. Office 
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in 2012 and the price of cocaine, one can see whether 
the policy had a significant effect on the price and thus the industry. The year of the policy is 
important because it was a declared end by the United States on the traditional methods of the 
War on Drugs and a more indirect approach on the drug industry itself. Reactions to such a 
policy change can be speculative and market-oriented, which is why it makes sense to have a 
jump and interaction variable respectively. This is done by using 2012 as a dummy variable in 
the time series of drug prices within 2007-2017. The regression analysis shows that the policy 
only had significant effects on the retail prices of cocaine not the wholesale prices, as shown by 
higher p-values. Retail prices show significant correlation (low p-values): a weak positive trend 
for retail prices in the period, a big positive jump during the time of policy implementation 
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(2012) and a strong negative trend in retail prices thereafter, working against the objectives of 
the policy itself. This means that the jump might be speculative price shocks as a result of 
expectations of a more effective policy, but the market reactions which have more time lag 
resulted in a trend in the opposite direction. 
Table 1 shows these results clearly by having the first column of data correspond to 
Figure 1 and the second column to Figure 2. Wholesale prices had no significant trends in the 
period analyzed, which implies that they are steadily controlled by cartels, fulfilling the 
monopsony observations of Wainwright. The ONDCP policy in 2012 which was said to be 
“different from the War on Drugs”, did not seem to impress domestic coca markets in South 
America. There was no significant jump, so cartels were not compelled to change wholesale 
prices at which the buy coca from farmers. In other words, cartels did not expect a major shift in 
their industry as a result of the policy, which reflects a general attitude of distrust for the 
effectiveness of U.S. foreign drug policy. The policy also stays away from legalization and 
decimalization, which is what most authors in the secondary literature argue to be the best 
avenue for defeating the industry from within through innovative de jure regulation. 
In the second column of the regression table one can see that all variables aside from the 
constant are significant. The Year variable has a mildly significant positive trend in the period 
analyzed. This just means that throughout 2007-2017, retails prices have been steadily 
increasing, though not by an extremely steep gradient. On the other hand, the Policy variable has 
a significant coefficient, which implies a large jump at the time of policy implementation. This 
could mean that dealers in the U.S. speculated the policy to make their illicit business 
unprofitable, so they sold at higher prices around the time the policy was announced to 
accumulate capital and find solutions to the market shocks that might occur. The Interaction 
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coefficient is also significant, though it was a negative trend after 2012. In other words, drug 
prices actually decreased after the policy was enacted, which is the exact opposite of what the 
government wanted since they hoped that higher prices would decrease demand and this 
consumption. The R-squared is also higher for Retail than for Wholesale, though not by a lot. 
Conclusion: 
 The political and social impact of coca production on the Andean countries of Colombia, 
Peru, and Bolivia (in that order) is unavoidable. Supply-side policies only changed prices 
charged by dealers at the consumption levels, having little to no effect on input prices at earlier 
stages of the supply chain. During the period analyzed, these economies saw positive economic 
growth until a period of negative growth in 2014-2016 and a slow recovery after (except Bolivia 
which had slow positive growth in the period analyzed). If one gives a two-year lag to the 
economic effects of policy change by the ONDCP, it is likely that the ambiguity and lack of 
focus of the new policy only worked to strengthen drug cartels who were given leeway to search 
for higher profits and deteriorate economic growth in the countries analyzed. One could also 
argue that the peace process in Colombia in 2016, a political movement that disarmed the FARC 
guerilla, helped dismantle one of the largest cartel organizations in South America, which helped 
the countries’ economies recover. It is thus clear that current policies aimed at reducing supply 
through eradication and sometimes fumigation, supported by local military and U.S. foreign 
policy, are not effective measures to control the cocaine industry. Rather, policy makers should 
look at cartels like profit-hungry industries that have complex global supply chains with plenty 
of protection measures. Regional efforts to decriminalize cocaine would offer the best solution to 
transfer the ownership of the industry from violent criminals to more controllable trafficking 
organizations. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Regression Analysis for Cocaine Prices 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Wholesale Retail 
   
Year 2,002 13,900* 
 (1,841) (7,328) 
Policy 5.201e+06 5.678e+07*** 
 (3.700e+06) (1.586e+07) 
Interaction -2,590 -28,214*** 
 (1,841) (7,892) 
Constant -3.987e+06 -2.774e+07 
 (3.699e+06) (1.472e+07) 
   
Observations 11 11 
R-squared 0.646 0.716 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 2: Retail Prices 
 
